Abstract. This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their actions on the contracts of the other players. These contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. This is accomplished by constructing contracts which are definable functions of the Godel code of every other player's contract. We provide a complete characterization of the set of allocations supportable as pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium of this contracting game. When information is complete, this characterization provides a folk theorem. In general, the set of supportable allocations is smaller than the set supportable by a centralized mechanism designer.
Self Referential Strategies and Reciprocity in Static Games
In this paper we characterize the allocation rules attainable by players in a Bayesian game when they have the ability to commit themselves by writing contracts that condition on other players' contracts.
The idea that contracts might condition on other contracts is not new in economics. The best known expression of this idea is well known in the industrial organization literature (e.g. (Salop 1986) ) as the 'meet the competition' clause in which one firm commits itself to lower its price when any of its competitors does.
A similar idea appears in trade theory as the principle of reciprocity ( (Bagwell and Staiger 2001) ). Countries enact trade legislation in which they agree to abide by a trade agreement like GATT. The legislation commits the country to lower tariffs in response to trade legislation by another country that lowers tariff, provided this other countries legislation agrees to abide by GATT. Finally, tax treaties sometimes have this flavor -for example, out of state residents who work in Pennsylvania are exempt from Pennsylvania tax as long as they live in a state that has a 'reciprocal' agreement that exempts out of state residents (presumably from Pennsylvania) from state taxes.
1
In all of these examples, commitments are made that are conditional on commitments of others, and are used to support cooperative outcomes. The literature on this treats these as static games of complete information. Additionally, the contracts that are used to support equilibrium are idiosyncratic, so that only the simplest most stylized problems are amenable to analysis. For example, in the meet the competition argument, a firm A offers to sell at a very high price provided its competitor, firm B, also offers a high price. If instead, B offers any price below the highest price, A commits itself to sell at marginal cost. If B believes this commitment, then one best reply for B is to set the highest price. In the trade and taxation Version -May 5, 2010 . 1 http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/revenue/cwp/view.asp?A=238&Q=244681 treaties mentioned above, a state cooperates by offering a 'reciprocal' contract that cooperates if and only if the other state does the same. (Tennenholtz 2004 ) suggests a way to support outcomes other than those that seem 'cooperative'. His players compete using computer programs that condition their actions on other programs. He shows that all individually rational outcomes in complete information games can be supported as equilibrium.
2 Basically, two programs implement cooperative actions if they know that they have the same syntax, otherwise, they punish each other. As he is only concerned with showing that implementable outcomes can be supported as program equilibrium, he does not give a complete description of what the set of possible programs looks like. So it isn't possible from his results to determine whether or not outcomes that aren't individually rational might also be supportable as program equilibrium. (A.T. Kalai and Samet 2007) , whose method we illustrate below, specifically construct a set of commitment devices for a two player game of complete information with the property that allocations are supportable as equilibrium in these commitment devices if and only if they are individually rational.
Our objective in this paper is twofold. First, we provide a general set of commitment devices that can can be described independently of the game to which they are applied, but which possess a property that is essential when providing a complete characterization of supportable outcomes. We refer to this property as the 'invariant punishment property'. It means that contractual reactions to deviations cannot depend on the outcome of the deviation, though they can obviously depend on the contract that the deviator chooses. It is this property that allows us to show that players payoffs cannot be held below their individually rational level in games of complete information.
3 Second, we want to use our methods to show how to extend the static complete information folk theorem results of papers like (Tennenholtz 2004) or (A.T. Kalai and Samet 2007) to games of incomplete information. We provide a complete characterization of outcomes that can be supported as (pure strategy) equilibrium in finite contracting games of incomplete information. Though there is no agreed definition in the literature of what a folk theorem would say in games with incomplete information, our results do indicate that contracts are more restrictive in such games. In the complete information case, it is known that outcomes in which every player receives more than his or her minmax payoff can be supported as equilibrium in contracts with the appropriate choice of commitment devices. One way to think of such allocations is that they are the allocations that could be supported by a centralized mechanism designer who can enforce actions of all players who agree to participate in his mechanism, and who minmaxes players who unilaterally decide not to participate. In the incomplete information case, we show that there are allocations that a centralized mechanism designer like this can support, but which cannot be supported with contracts.
The reason that a 'folk theorem' like result doesn't hold with incomplete information has to do with 'participation'. A player who doesn't play along with some cooperative agreement enforced by contracts will still observe any information that 2 By 'individually rational outcome' in a game of complete information, we mean an outcome in which each player receives at least his minmax payoff.
3 More specifically, if players can react to the outcomes of a deviation by appropriately crafting their contract, then they could conceivable respond to the action that a deviating player takes. This would make it possible to keep some players' payoffs at their maxmin level, instead of just their minmax.
the contracts themselves convey about the types of the other players. In the play of the ensuing game, the deviator can make use of this information when choosing his actions. To capture this, we show that allocations are supportable if and only if they are supportable by a mechanism designer who can condition actions only on publicly observable messages.
1.1. Contractible Contracts. One problem that arises when contracts can depend on one another is that some care needs to be taken to specify exactly what contracts are feasible. For example, contracts that condition directly on the actions that other contracts specify might not make sense. In the meet the competition argument with two possible prices, suppose one seller's contract commits to a high price if and only if the other seller charges a high price, while the second seller commits to a high price if and only if the other seller sets a low price. Then there is no pair of prices consistent with these contracts. To ensure that contracts always resolve unambiguously we need to take more care in specifying what is possible.
One possibility (which we illustrate momentarily), is to limit the set of commitment devices available to players (typically in a manner that depends on the details of the game being studied) to exactly the set needed to support the cooperative outcomes that we are interested in. This is the approach developed in (A.T. Kalai and Samet 2007) . Consistency of the various devices in then built in.
This approach has the undesirable feature that these commitment devices might not be robust to contractual innovation. Ideally, if we want commitment devices that can condition on the devices used by others, it would be desirable that the set of feasible contracts or commitment devices would include all functions from itself into the set of feasible actions. This would ensure that any new contract we could dream up would already be a feasible contract. Unfortunately, this is impossible because the cardinality of the set of functions with a domain is larger than the cardinality of the domain (Cantor's Theorem). Our approach is instead to describe the largest set of contracts that can be written in a finite set of characters using first order logic.
To illustrate how our approach works, we begin with the argument in (A.T. Kalai and Samet 2007) and apply it to a simple two player prisoner's dilemma. We want to construct a set of commitment devices that will support cooperative play.
We define a contract called 'this' contract which works as follows:
this contract = C if other player's contract = this contract D otherwise.
If both players in the prisoners dilemma offer 'this contract', then they are unambiguously obliged to cooperate. If one of the players offers something else, then the other is unambiguously required to defect. As long as the deviator's contract specifies some unambiguous outcome against 'this contract', cooperation is a Nash equilibrium. Depending on what other contracts are described by the word 'otherwise' in the sentence above, there may be many other possible equilibrium outcomes as well.
To complete the description of the contracting game, let Θ be a set of feasible contracts defined in such a way that θ ∈ Θ =⇒ θ : Θ → A. We are about to judiciously construct Θ. We have just described a reciprocal contract θ * such that
Suppose we simply add to this a pair of 'constant' contracts θ c ∈ Θ such that
The constant contracts could be used to support the Nash equilibrium in the prisoners dilemma in the obvious way. Since the outcome (C, C) and (D, D) are the only two outcomes for which all players receive at least their minmax payoffs, the collection consisting of the contract θ * and the two constant contracts already supports all outcomes for which each player receives at least her min max payoff. Furthermore, if Θ = {θ * , θ c , θ d }, it is pretty clear that no other (pure) outcomes can be supported as equilibrium in contracts. In other words, now that we have the set Θ we have a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes. This characterization amounts to a folk theorem.
This method can be generalized to many different players, and incomplete information.
4 From our perspective, it has two undesirable features. The first is that the set of commitment devices has to be constructed using the details of the game that is being analyzed. The commitment devices we just described obviously won't be much use in a game with more than two players or more than two actions. Indeed, if we simply relabel the actions so that C stands for defection and D stands for cooperation, then these commitment devices will support only the non-cooperative outcome. We can create new sets of commitment devices to handle these changes without much problem. What we would like to do instead, is to provide a set of commitment devices that always works.
Second, the set of contracts made available in this approach seems much too restrictive. Contracts depend on other contracts, but in a very limited way. If a player offers the contract that he is 'supposed' to offer, then things go well. Otherwise something bad happens. Yet this bad outcome can't depend in any way on what the deviator actually does. In other words, the punishment imposed on a deviator only depends on the deviator's identity but not on the actual deviation. This is not at all a natural property of contracts that depend on other contracts. In (A.T. Kalai and Samet 2007) and (Tennenholtz 2004) , this is true by assumption.
Relaxing this constraint on contracts creates a difficulty when attempting to provide a full characterization of supportable outcomes. The reason is that natural bounds on outcomes like the minmax payoff themselves rely on this property. The actions that minmax a deviating player are independent of the deviation that is actually made. If contracts allow reactions to depend on deviations, then in principle, it might be possible to support outcomes in which some players' payoffs are below their minmax payoff. 4 We leave out the details of this construction since we do it in a more general way below.
However, it is easy enough to see how the idea works in a game of complete information. For each outcome of the game, create a contract for each player indexed by that outcome. Player i's contract states that if all other players offer the contract indexed by that same outcome, then i is committed to play his action in that outcome. If a single player offers some other contract, then i is committed to minmax that (deviating) player. Otherwise the contract specifies some arbitrary action. It is easy to see that this supports every outcome in which each player receives more than his or her pure strategy minmax payoff.
In the complete information environment, there is an easy fix to the problem mentioned in the previous paragraph, which is to allow players to offer contracts which do not specify a single action, but a subset of his action space. With such a contract space, a deviator can always offer a contract which does not restrict his action space at all, and then best-respond to the action profile of the others. Then the worst possible punishment players can impose on a deviator is indeed an action profile which minmaxes him. Therefore, restricting attention to punishments which are independent of the actual deviation is without loss of generality.
Unfortunately, this same approach fails in games with incomplete information. The reason is that players who punish a deviator might not restrict their action space to be a singleton precisely because they might not want to reveal too much information to a deviator. Therefore, following a deviation, even the non-deviators will strategically choose their actions in the subgame generated by a contract profile. Hence, a deviator might actually benefit from restricting his action space.
It is a notable feature of our contracts that we can provide a complete characterization without restricting the contract space in this un-natural way.
How Definability Works. We endow each market player with a formal language and require each contract to be a text written in this language. A text is a finite string of symbols. It is well known that there are bijections from the set of texts into the set of integers. One such a mapping is called the Gdel Coding. This implies that any contract uniquely corresponds to an integer. A contract of a player is a mapping from contract profiles to subsets of his action space. Since the contracts correspond to integers, one can think of such a contract as a description of an arithmetic correspondence from the codes of contracts to the codes of the names of the actions. There is a well-known set of arithmetic correspondences, called the definable correspondences, which can be precisely described in the formal language by using finitely many characters. (We shall formally define this set later.) Hence, one can think of the contract space as the set of definable functions from N m → 2 N , where m is the number of players. The arguments of these functions are the codes of the contracts of the players, and the last and the ranges of these functions are the subsets of the codes of the names of the actions. We identify the contract space of a player with the set of definable correspondences.
To see how our approach works, return to the simple prisoner's dilemma game. Let [c] denote the Gdel code of the contract c and refer to [c] as the 'encoding' of c. For any pair of strategies c 1 and c 2 , the action (C or D) taken by player 1 is c 1 ([c 2 ]) and similarly for player 2. Since every pair of actions determines a payoff, this procedure associates a unique payoff with every pair of strategies.
There are many things that aren't definable contracts that also have Gdel codes. We want to make use of some of these other things. In particular, we want to use definable functions with free variables. Interpreting n as the encoding of the other player's contract, here is a definable contract with a free variable
Free variable has the natural interpretation that x can take on any integer value. Definable contracts with free variables are also definable, and so they too have Godel codes. The contract with free variable that we want is a slight modification of the one above, in particular
is also a contract with a free variable. The mapping < x > (x) is the composition of two functions. First, the function x is the inverse operation to the Gdel coding. That is, < n > is the text whose Gdel code is n. Second, if φ is a text with one free variable, then φ (n) is the same text where the value of the free variable is set to be n. Hence, if n is a Godel code of a definable contract with one free variable, then < n > (n) is itself a definable contract (without a free variable). n (n) is just the Godel code of whatever this definable contract happens to be. We want to create a contract by fixing a very specific value for x in (1.1). In particular, the value of x we are interested in is [c x ]. Since [c x ] is the Godel code of a contract with a free variable, the right hand side of (1.1) requires that we decode [c x ] to get c x , then fix x at [c x ] to get the contract c [cx] . Putting all this together gives
This is the contract corresponds with the one we called 'this' contract or θ * in our discussion above. The difference is that this contract now reacts to a much broader set of contracts that θ * did. The contract θ * could only respond to itself and to the two constant contracts. The contract c [cx] responds to any definable function (in fact it specifies an action for every finite text).
To press the analogy with θ * in the problem above, if player 2 also uses strategy c [cx] , then [c 2 ] = c [cx] , which evidently triggers the cooperative action by player 1. The same argument applies for player 2. Player 2 can deviate to any alternative definable strategy c ′ that she likes. Since every definable strategy has a Godel code, the reaction of player 1, and consequently both players payoffs are well defined. As the Godel coding is injective, c ′ = c [cx] implies the Godel code of c ′ is not equal to c [cx] , and the deviation by 2 induces 1 to respond by switching from C to D.
What this argument illustrates is that our contract space is large enough that we can always find a contract corresponding to θ * in our existing set of contracts, without having to explicitly construct it from the details of the game. This is the property that makes our contracts universal in the sense that exactly the same set of contracts can be used to characterize equilibrium outcomes in all games.
As an outline of what is to come, we start with a brief discussion of the way our results relate to some previous papers in the literature. We then describe our model and give an introductory description of definable functions that includes the various formal properties of definability that we use in our construction. We formally define our contracting game, then illustrate all of our results in a relatively simple two player game of incomplete information. In particular, this section is designed to illustrate the way that definability is used to get our results. We then state our main theorem and give a complete proof. The last part of the paper provides some examples and gives a number special results for special environments that are often studied in the contract literature.
Literature
As we mentioned in the introduction, our paper is not the first to show how contractual devices can be used to support cooperative play. Much of the literature in this area follows an idea developed in (Fershtman and Judd 1987) in which actions are delegated to an agent who is given the appropriate incentives to carry out actions that might not otherwise be part of a non-cooperative equilibrium. This idea was developed by (Katz 2006 ) who used it to prove a 'folk theorem' for a very specialized environment.
The idea that the agent might be used to report deviations, thereby allowing principals to commit themselves to punish a deviator, is developed in (Epstein and Peters 1999) . It would be possible to have agents report the Godel codes of the mechanisms offered by other players instead of having them report their 'universal type'. Fixing the environment, the set of mechanisms like this is embedded in the universal set of mechanisms that they describe in the sense that every such mechanism is payoff equivalent to a mechanism in their space. There are two important differences between the papers. The first is that we provide a characterization of supportable allocations in this paper, while no such characterization exists in their framework. The second is that the universal set of mechanisms is defined relative to (and depends on) the environment to which the idea is applied. The set of definable contracts does not. So, for example, the universal set of mechanisms for every environment we study is finite, while the set of definable functions is not. The reason is that the set of definable contracts is designed to be broad enough to work in many different environments.
The idea that agents can report deviations provides the basis for the menu theorems in common agency, like (Martimort and Stole 1998) , (Peters 2001 ) and (Han 2006) which illustrate how cooperative outcomes can be supported. (Martimort and Moreira 2007) , for example, have a result similar to ours showing that not all the outcome functions supported by a mechanism designer can be supported by common agency equilibrium. Common agency restricts to a single agent. Recently (Yamashita 2007 ) provides a partial folk theorem for multiple agency games in which principals can commit to follow the recommendations of (potentially interested) agents.
Though this literature shows how contractual devices can be used to support cooperative behavior, it relies on the delegation of decision making power to an agent. In this paper, there is no agent, because contracts depend directly on one another. Our approach is closely related to ideas in the computer science literature. One paper we have already mentioned that uses this approach is (Tennenholtz 2004) . He has players writing programs that determine their actions. Using an idea due to von Neumann, he allows these programs to use other programs as data, which has the effect of making the output of each player's program depend on the other players' programs. We illustrated the idea with our description of 'this contract' in the introduction.
In order to show that individually rational profiles can be supported as equilibrium, all he needs is the existence of some set of commitment devices that support cooperation. As we illustrated above, it isn't hard to find these. However, to characterize all equilibrium outcomes, a precise description of the set of feasible commitment devices is needed. We showed how to do this for a specific game above. This is somewhat unsatisfactory, since the set of commitment devices is built from the properties of a specific game and can be used to characterize equilibrium only for that game. It would be desirable to have a set of commitment devices that is universal in the sense that the definition of the set of commitment devices is independent of the game. This could be done simply by asserting that the set of feasible commitment devices is the union of the set of commitment devices created as we did it above for all possible games. This leads to the problem that it becomes difficult or impossible to check whether this large set of commitment devices might support arbitrary action profiles (for example, profiles where some player uses a dominated action, or gets a payoff less than his minmax).
What we provide here is a set of commitment devices that are defined independently of any particular game, but which nonetheless allows us to provide a common characterization of equilibrium for all games. This characterization relies on the invariant punishment property that we mentioned above.
Finally, the paper by (A.T. Kalai and Samet 2007) give a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes in two player complete information games. They construct a set of (game specific) commitment devices which can be used to support correlated strategies in which all players payoffs exceed their minmax payoffs. Specifically, in some games their devices support outcomes in which all players receive payoffs that exceed their best payoffs with Tennenholz's programs. This is accomplished by constructing commitment devices that allow players to correlate their actions while using independent randomizing devices. We extend part of their argument to games of incomplete information. We cannot deal with correlation because we focus on pure outcomes.
The Model
3.1. The Language and the Gdel Coding. We consider a formal language, which is sufficiently rich to allow its user to state propositions in arithmetic. (The Appendix provides a formal definition of a first-order language.) Furthermore, the set of statements in this language is closed under the finite applications of the Boolean operations: , ∨, and ∧. In addition, the language contains variable symbols, such as x, y, which enables one to express, for example, Fermat's Last Theorem:
In fact, one can also express statements in the language that involves any finite number of free variables. For example, "x is a prime number" is a statement in the language. The symbol x is a free variable in the statement. Another example for a predicate that has one free variable is "x < 4." One can substitute any integer into x and then the predicate is either true or false. This particular one is true if x = 0, 1, 2, 3 and false otherwise. Let L be the set of all formulas of the formal language. Each of its element is a finite string of symbols. It is well known that one can construct a one-to-one function L → N. Let [ϕ] be the value of this function at ϕ ∈ L, and call it the Gdel Code of the text ϕ.
In what follows, we define a class of functions which can be represented by finitely many characters in our formal language.
We provide a formal definition of first-order arithmetic statement in the appendix. If the correspondence f is definable by the statement φ then we refer to [φ] as a Godel encoding of f . We illustrate the previous definition with an example.
Example. Consider the following function defined on N:
f (a) = 0 if a is an even number, 1 if a is an odd number.
We show that this function is definable by constructing the corresponding predicate φ. φ (x, y) ≡ {{y = 1} ∨ {y = 0}} ∧ {∃z : 2z = y + x} . Notice that φ indeed has two free variables. (The variable z is not free because there is a quantifier front of it.) The first part of φ states that y is either one or zero. The second part says that x + y is divisible by two. Clearly, f (a) = 0 if and only if φ (a, 0) is true and f (a) = 1 if and only if φ (a, 1) = 1.
there is a first order predicate
with k+1 free variables that represents f . We define a Gdel code of the function with free variables
. Since a definable function from N k into 2 N with q free variables is just a definable function from N k+q into 2 N , each property of definable functions is also a property of definable functions with free variables.
We can now describe the properties of definable functions that we need in our proofs. We need two pieces of notations. First, recall from the introduction that if n ∈ N then < n > denotes the text whose Gdel code is n, that is, [< n >] = n. Let g be a function from {1, ..., q} to the set of variable symbols such that
) is a finite vector of variable symbols. Then for any text ϕ and (n 1 , ..., n q ) ∈ N q , let ϕ (n1,...,nq) denote the text where if the symbol g (k) stands for a free variable in ϕ then g (k) is substituted for n k in ϕ for k = 1, ..., q. For example, if g (1) = x 1 and g (2) = x 2 , ϕ is "x 1 < x 2 ", n 1 = 1, and n 2 = 2 then ϕ (n1,n2) is 1 < 2.
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Suppose that g (i) = x i for i = 1, ..., q, and consider the following text in n free variable: < x k > (x1,...,xq) , where k ≤ q. Since the Gdel coding is a bijection, < n k > is a text for each n k ∈ N. Since ϕ (n1,...,nq) is defined for all ϕ and (n 1 , .
The following is a well-known result in Mathematical Logic:
vector of distinct free variables, and for all
This basic result is central to the construction of cross-referential contracts. The next result is used to show that the contracts we construct to support various kinds of equilibrium are definable. 
Lemma 2. For any set
N , and B 1 , ..., B k+1 ⊂ N are finite sets. For all n ∈ N k let n i denote the ith coordinate of n. Then the following correspondence is definable:
otherwise.
We point out that all the contracts we use to construct equilibrium in our games are in the form of (iv) of Lemma 2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.2. The Game. There are m players indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., m}. Player i has a finite action space A i , and let A denote × m i=1 A i . Player i has a type t i drawn from a finite set T i , and let T denote × m i=1 T i . The joint distribution of types is common knowledge. The payoff of Player i is u i : A × T → R. Each player i is endowed with a contract space C i . The set C i is the set of all arithmetic statements defining non-empty correspondences from N m → N in the sense of Definition 1.
The contracting game takes place in two stages. In the first stage, each player submits a contract from his contract space simultaneously. Let c i ∈ C i denote the contract submitted by Player i. For each Player i, consider the following subset of A i determined by the contract profile c = (c 1 , ..., c n ):
In the second stage, Player i takes action from S i (c) simultaneously.
6 As always
In what follows we restrict attention to pure strategies. A strategy of Player i consists of a mapping from his type space into his contract space, and a mapping from his types and first-stage contract profiles to his action space. Let Γ i denote the first stage strategies of Player i, that is,
Similarly let A i denote the set of second-stage strategies of Player i, that is,
Bayesian equilibrium if and only if for all i ∈ {1, ..., m}, t i ∈ T i , γ i ∈ Γ i and α i ∈ Σ i :
where α = α i , α * −i and γ = γ i , γ * −i . A deterministic allocation in our model is a mapping from T to A. We say that an allocation s : T → A is supportable as a Bayesian equilibrium in the contracting game if there is a Bayesian equilibrium (γ
Bayesian equilibrium imposes no restriction at all on the second stage actions α * −i t −i , γ i , γ * −i (t −i ) that player i anticipates when he deviates, apart from the fact that α *
could be strictly dominated for player j with type t j by some other action in S j γ i , γ * −i (t −i ) . For this reason, it may be that refinements of equilibrium are necessary in applications to rule out this kind of second stage behavior.
Refinements are completely incidental to our formalism, although they are obviously going to make a difference to the precise set of allocations that are supportable as equilibrium. The less controversial refinements, like sequential equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium do not fit easily into our environment since our action spaces aren't finite and player types can be correlated. The detailed formalism we need to modify these concepts takes us well beyond our main purpose in this paper. For these reasons, we provide a more abstract description that describes refinements in a manner that is independent of the particular game that is being played.
A refinement is a restriction on the strategy rules of the different types of nondeviating players in the second stage following a deviation by some player i in the first stage. These restrictions are typically supposed to be more fundamental than the game to which they are applied. For example, we might want to rule out the possibility that some player of some type chooses a strictly dominated action. Strict dominance is a notion that depends on feasible sets of actions and payoff functions, but not on the game in which these are embedded. Generally, refinements impose restrictions that can depend on the sets to which the players are constrained in the second stage, the information that has been revealed by the non-deviators' first period contracts, and the outcome that would have prevailed had there not been a deviation. Informally, the sets to which players are constrained when choosing their second period actions are used to determine whether or not some actions are dominated for certain player types. The information conveyed by first period play is used for refinements like perfect Bayesian equilibrium that require the use of Bayes rule for making inferences about non-deviating players. The original equilibrium outcome is used in refinements like the 'intuitive criterion', which restrict beliefs that non-deviators can have about the deviating player based on what he might have expected to gain by deviating.
Formally, let a * : T → A denote the equilibrium allocation, that is, a * (t) = α * (t, γ * (t)) for each t. Let τ i be the partition of T i generated by i's equilibrium strategy, or in the context of our contract game, τ i (t i ) = {t
Let F i be a τ −i measurable correspondence from T −i into A representing the sets to which the players are constrained when choosing their actions following a deviation by player i. If Player i deviates to contract γ i , then this correspondence is
) . A refinement specifies for every deviator i, every F i measurable with respect to some information partition τ −i , and every status quo allocation, a * , a non-empty set of action profiles for the non-deviators that the refinement allows for each profile of their types. Let R i a * , F i , τ , t −i ⊂ A −i \ {∅} describe this correspondence. If an equilibrium has the non-deviators using strategy rules α *
in response to a deviation to contract γ i by player i, then the equilibrium satisfies the refinement if
The properties to be built into the refinement correspondence R i are going to depend on the particular application. For example, if types are independently distributed, then perfect Bayesian equilibrium is well defined and R i a * , S γ i , γ * −i (t −i ) , τ , t −i would, for each t −i consist of all action profiles for the non-deviators that constitute actions these types would jointly take in some Bayesian equilibrium of the game with action spaces S γ i , γ * −i (t −i ) and beliefs given by posterior beliefs conditional on non-deviators types lying in τ −i (t −i ).
7 In a game of complete information with equilibrium contracts c * i , c * −i and equilibrium outcome a * , a deviation to c ′ by player i supports the collection of action profiles F i = S c ′ , c * −i which are just the actions to which players are constrained in the second stage by their first period contracts. The subgame perfection refinement of Nash equilibrium would specify
where N F i is just the set of action profiles a −i ∈ A −i for which there exists an action a i ∈ S −i c ′ , c * −i such that (a i , a −i ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game with action spaces S c ′ , c * −i . In a game of incomplete information, a simple refinement would be to require that non-deviating players don't use actions that are strictly dominated given the subsets to which players are constrained by their first period contracts. Assuming that Player i deviates to some γ i , R i a * , F i , τ , t −i is the set of action profiles a −i such that for each j = i , a j is not strictly dominated for player j when his type is t j given that the others are constrained to choose actions in F i (t j , t −j ). Finally, 7 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium does not have a well accepted definition when types are correlated. To see why, observe that when player i deviates, non-deviators have to make some inference about his type. The on path choices of the non-deviators reveal their types to be in some subset. The distribution of non-deviators' types within this subset depends on the deviating player's type. So either inferences about non-deviating players depend on actions of the deviator, or the common prior assumption has to be abandoned.
if we simply want to describe Bayesian equilibrium, then we could do so by having
Fix a refinement R. Let τ be the information partition induced by the equilibrium strategies γ * (that is,
We say that (γ * , α * ) is an R-equilibrium of the contracting game if (3.1) holds, and in addition
A Bayesian Example
In this section we provide an extended discussion of a two player example that illustrates all of the primary results in the paper. We begin by showing how the discussion in the introduction can be extended to handle incomplete information in order to support implementable allocations as equilibrium. A slight modification of the example is used to illustrate why contracts cannot support all the allocations implementable by a mechanism designer. Finally, we illustrate the role that definability plays in proving that all contract equilibrium are implementable.
Suppose that there are two players. The action space of Player 1 is {a 1 , a 2 } and the action space of Player 2 is {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 }. The type space of Player 1 is D = {−1, 1} and the type space of Player 2 is T × D = {3, −3} × {−1, 1}. Any realization of the type of each player is equally likely, and the types of the players are independently distributed. If the type of Player 1 is d 1 and the type of Player 2 is (t, d 2 ) then the payoffs to the players are defined by the following matrix:
We want to show that the following allocation can be supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the contracting game:
In this allocation the action of Player 1 varies with the type of Player 2. Therefore, if the players played this game without the contracting stage, the allocation s could not be implemented as a Bayesian equilibrium. Moreover, Player 2 always takes action a 0 in the allocation s. Given a 0 , Player 1 would like to deviate and take action a 1 no matter what the types are. Below we show how to construct a contract of Player 2 which prevents such a deviation.
The construction of the contracts is more complicated than the one in the example of the introduction for two reasons. First, unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, this game is not symmetric. Therefore, the equilibrium contracts of the players are different, and they will be cross-referential instead of being self-referential. Second, since information is incomplete, a player with different types offers different contracts, hence, it is not enough to construct one contract for each player.
Following the method in the introduction, we start with texts involving three free variables. The first text corresponds to Player 1, and the other two texts correspond to the two realizations of the first coordinate of the type of Player 2, 3 and −3. The equilibrium contracts will not depend on d 1 and d 2 . Consider the following texts:
{a 1 , a 2 } otherwise. and for t = 3, −3:
otherwise and if t = t. The free variable x corresponds to the code of the contract of Player 1 and the free variables x 3 and x −3 correspond to the codes of the contracts of Player 2 with t = 3 and t = −3, respectively. These texts are not contracts because they contain free variables. However, if the three free variables are substituted by any triple of integers, these texts become contracts. Indeed, for any three integers these texts uniquely determine a subset of the action space of the player as a function of the code of the other player's contract.
By Lemmas 1 and 2, these contracts with free variables are all definable. So we can compute Gdel codes c x,x 3 ,x −3 and c t x,x 3 ,x −3 (t = 3, −3). We are going to substitute these codes γ = c x,
in the texts and show that the resulting contracts support the allocation s as an equilibrium outcome. Let us start with the text of Player 1:
Since [ n ] = n for all n, c
by definition. Therefore, the previous text can be rewritten as:
Similarly, for t = 3, −3:
a 2 otherwise and if t = t.
, a 2 otherwise and if t = t.
By part (iv) of Lemma 2, all these contracts are definable. Notice that these contracts refer to each other and they implement the allocation s. Indeed, Player 1's contract, c γ , prescribes taking action a 1 if the contract of Player 2 is c The contracts always constrain the players to specific actions, so they cannot deviate in the second stage of the game. We only need to check deviations in contracts. The payoff of Player 2 is maximized by the allocation, so we only have to show it for Player 1. Any deviation of Player 1 triggers action a 2 by Player 2. The best response of Player 1 to this action is a 2 and it provides him with a payoff of 2, which is smaller than his expected equilibrium payoff, 3.
Next, we discuss a number of features of this contract equilibrium that will be of interest in the general model.
Information Content of the Contracts.-The contracts offered by Player 2 for each of the realizations of the first coordinate of his types is different. In this sense equilibrium play reveals something about Player 2's type. In fact, it is precisely this feature that makes it possible for Player 1 to take an action on the equilibrium path that depends on Player 2's type. However, there is a limit to this in the sense that Player 1's action can only vary with Player 2's type to the extent that type information is revealed through the equilibrium contract. In our example, the action of Player 1 cannot depend on d 2 because d 2 is not revealed through the equilibrium contracts.
The two contracts of Player 2, c γ , are computationally equivalent, that is, they determine the same action for Player 2 as a function of the contract of Player 1. The only difference between the two contracts is the statement t = t in the second line in (4.1). This statement is always true, nonetheless it contains useful information for Player 1. Player 2 uses his contract to communicate his type to Player 1. This communication is not cheap talk because the contracts c t γ is also used by Player 2 as a commitment to punish Player 1 unless he credibly promises to make his action contingent on t by offering c γ .
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On the other hand, since contracts reveal information about types, a deviating player can make his second-stage action contingent on the types of the other players. This limits the set of allocations which are implementable by contractible contracts. We will show that a centralized mechanism designer can implement more allocations than our contracting game because he can prevent a non-participant player from learning about the types of the others.
Invariant Punishments.-Any deviation of a player at the contracting stage triggers a restriction on the action space of the other player. These restrictions can be viewed as a punishment for a deviation. Observe that our equilibrium is supported by 'punishments' that don't vary with the transgression. For example, Player 2 simply commits himself to choose a 2 whenever Player 1 offers a contract that is different from his equilibrium contract. In the next section, we prove that assuming that the contractual punishment is invariant to the deviation is without the loss of generality. (Of course, the punishment usually depends on the type of the punisher.) This is a corner stone of our analysis and it allows us to fully characterize the set of equilibrium allocations.
We further explain the significance of this property. Since the punishment for any contractual deviation of Player 1 is the same, he can best-respond to the equilibrium contract of Player 2. That is, the most profitable deviation of Player 1 specifies a restriction which is a best response to the punishment of Player 2 given the secondstage strategies. In some sense, this implies that Player 2 can only push down Player 1 to his minmax value. Consider now a modification of the original game such that the action profile (a 1 , a 0 ) generates a payoff of 3 to Player 1 instead of 6, but the payoffs are the same otherwise. In this case, our target allocation generates a payoff of 1.5 to Player 1. This payoff is lower than 2, and hence, the allocation cannot be implemented as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the contracting game. Next, we argue that our allocation could be implemented even in the modified game if the restriction of Player 2 could depend on the restriction of Player 1.
Since contracts are contractible, one might think that the punishment of Player 2 can arbitrarily vary with the deviation of Player 1. If this was possible then Player 2 could potentially push down Player 1 below his minmax value, perhaps even to his maxmin value. Suppose now, that the restriction of Player 2 can depend on the restriction of Player 1 generated by a deviation. Next, we present another table which summarizes the most effective punishment of Player 2, if the punishment can be contingent on the restriction implied by the deviation.
restrictions of Player 1 {a 1 } {a 2 } {a 1 , a 2 } best punishment of Player 2 {a 2 } {a 1 } {a 1 , a 2 } Payoff of Player 1 0 0 1.25 Therefore, if the restriction of Player 2 could depend on the restriction of Player 1, Player 1 can only achieve a payoff of 1.25. Hence, the target allocation could be implemented even in the modified game.
Here, we sketch the argument of the proof. We make the argument by contradiction and assume that Player 2 has access to a contract c * such that it punishes every deviation that commits Player 1 to action a 1 (a 2 ) with a commitment to play a 2 (a 1 ), and punishes every deviation that commits player 1 to action {a 1 , a 2 } with the restriction {a 1 , a 2 }. That is:
We show that there does not exist such a definable function. Consider the following function f : 2 {a1,a2} \ {∅} → 2 {a1,a2} \ {∅}:
and define the following contract in one free variable for Player 1:
In the next section, we show that this is a definable contract with a free variable as long as c * is definable. Let [c x ] be the Godel Code of this contract with a free variable. Suppose now that Player 1 offers the contract c [cx] . Then whatever the nature of the contract c * , the pair c [cx] , c * will uniquely determine a pair of subsets from which the players must choose their final actions. Notice that
by the definition of c [cx] . But then
Can this set be {a 2 }? Notice that
where the first equivalence follows from the second line of (4.3), and the second one follows from the second line of (4.2). This implies that c [cx] Equilibrium Refinement.-The allocations that are supportable as equilibrium will generally depend on equilibrium refinement concept. As we explained above, an important feature of the contract equilibrium is the restriction on the action space triggered by a deviation. Since deviations are off the equilibrium path, players never have to choose from these restricted set of actions on the equilibrium path. Different refinement concepts impose different restrictions on these off-equilibrium choices.
To see how refinement matters consider again the modified version of our example, and suppose that Player 2 restricts his action space to {a 1 , a 2 } whenever Player 1 deviates. Suppose that instead of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, one is interested in Bayesian equilibrium. This concept does not impose any restriction on off the equilibrium play. Hence, if Player 1 restricts his action space to be {a 1 }, Player 2 can still take action a 2 although it is strictly dominated. Similarly, if Player 1 restricts his action space to be {a 1 }, Player 2 can take action a 2 . In both of these cases, the payoff of Player 1 is zero. If Player 1 restricts his action space to be {a 1 , a 2 }, then the Player i can play a 1 if d i = 1 and a 2 otherwise. This provides Player 1 with an expected payoff of 1.25. Hence, the allocation s can be implemented as a Bayesian equilibrium even in the modified example.
The Characterization Theorem
There are several ways to state our characterization theorem. One of our objectives is to compare the set of equilibrium outcomes of the contracting game to the set of allocations implementable by a centralized mechanism designer who can control the actions of all the players who agree to participate in his mechanism. To help illustrate the relationship, we define a class of mechanisms, called Public Message Mechanisms (PMM) and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes relative to these mechanisms is identical to the set of equilibrium outcomes in the contracting game. The main difference between a PMM and a standard direct mechanism is that the reports of the players are publicly observable. This has several consequences. First, a non-participant player can learn about the types of the participants through their messages and can make his action contingent on these messages. As a result, non-participation is more profitable in a PMM that it would be in a comparable mechanism when messages are privately conveyed to the mechanism designer. Second, to prevent players from refusing to participate so that they can make use of this information, the mechanism might not to have participants fully reveal their types in the first stage. Finally, since the messages do not necessarily coincide with the types, the mechanism designer might not want to specify a single action for every player in response to some public messages. If instead, he allows the player to choose from a subset of his actions, then he makes it possible for the player's action to depend on his private information. Furthermore, he can exploit a non-participant's uncertainly about the types of the others when implementing a punishment.
Intuitively, the relationship between a PMM and the contracting game can be explained as follows. In a contracting equilibrium, a player with different types offers different contracts. Since the contracts are publicly observable, players learn about each other's types from the contracts. The contracts' information content about the types correspond to the public messages in a PMM. An equilibrium contract profile specifies restrictions on the action spaces of the players. These restrictions correspond to the second-stage restrictions of a PMM if each player participates. It is less clear what is the connection between the contracting game and the property of a PMM which says that the restrictions imposed on participants does not depend on the commitment devices submitted by the non-participants. The reader should think about a non-participant in a PMM as a deviator in the contracting game, and the commitment device of a non-participant as the deviator's contract. Since the contracts are contractible, the restriction imposed by a contract of a player can vary with the contract of a deviator. However, we show that it is without the loss of generality to assume that uncooperative behavior by one player in the contracting game provokes a punishing contractual response from the others that doesn't depend on how the deviator goes about being uncooperative.
We restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms and pure strategies. Our main theorem does not depend on the particular equilibrium refinement concept. Recall, that we refer to a Bayesian equilibrium satisfying a certain refinement as an R-equilibrium. Our main theorem can be stated as follows.
Theorem 3. An allocation is implementable as an R-equilibrium in the contracting game if and only if it is implementable as an R-equilibrium by a public message mechanism.
A simple public message mechanism is a public message mechanism in which each player's message space is a partition of his type space. The mechanism is incentive compatible if each player prefers to report the partition element that contains his true type. It is individually rational if every player, no matter his type, would rather participate in the mechanism than unilaterally commit himself to a subset of his actions that depends on the partition elements reported by the other players. By standard arguments in mechanism design, an allocation can be supported as an R−equilibrium in a public message mechanism if and only if there is an incentive compatible and individually rational simple public message mechanism that supports the same allocation. For this reason we will restrict attention to simple public message mechanisms which are incentive compatible and individually rational.
Next we characterize the set of implementable allocations with constraints. Let
Ti be the partition from which player i's must choose his report. Let τ , τ −i , and τ −ij denote × n i=1 τ i , × j =i τ j , and × k =i,j τ k respectively. Let r i (t) ⊂ A i denote the restricted action space of player i if each player participates, and the message sent by player j is τ j (t j ). Since the restrictions can depend only on the partition elements that each player reports, r i must be measurable with respect to τ , that is, r i (t) = r i (t ′ ) whenever τ i (t i ) = τ i (t ′ i ) for all i. Furthermore, let p j i (t −j ) denote the restriction on the action space of player i if all players but player j participate, and the message sent by player q is τ q (t q ) for all q = j. The function p j i (t −j ) is measurable with respect to τ −ij . A simple public message mechanism is given by (τ , r, p)
. A public message mechanism only constrains players to subsets of their action space, so we need to describe what happens at the second stage. We start with the equilibrium path. Let s i denote the strategy of player i at the second stage if each player participates. That is, s i : T → A i , such that s i (t) ∈ r i (t) for all t, and s i is measurable with respect to τ −i . Note that since player i knows his own type, s i does not have to be measurable with respect to τ i . Next, we describe the strategies of the players following a deviation. Let
The set F i is the action space of player i in the first stage if he does not participate in the mechanism. If player i submits f i (∈ F i ) and player j reports τ j (t j ) for j = i, then player i's restricted action space is f i (t −i ) ⊂ A i in the second stage . Let s j i denote the second-stage strategy of player i if all players but player j participates. That is, s
, and s j i is measurable with respect to τ −ij .
An allocation s is supportable as an equilibrium in the public message game (or alternatively, is implementable by a simple public message mechanism) if there is a simple public message mechanisms (τ , r, p) such that the following inequalities hold. The first one guarantees that each player sends a truthful message in the first stage of the game. For each i = 1, . . . m, and for all t i ,t
The max operator on the right hand side implies that the player to choose a best reply from his restricted action space given his posterior belief. Taken together, these constraints for all the players requires that play in the second stage constitutes a Bayesian equilibrium of the game in which each player chooses an action from the set of actions to which he is restricted, given posterior beliefs about players' types.
To deal with deviations at the first stage of the PMM, we require that for each
The inequality says that even if the deviator chooses a best reply from the set of actions to which he is restricted, he cannot gain by deviating. Additional constraints must be imposed on s i when there is a refinement. Then, no matter what commitment f i (t −i ) player i makes, the participating players respond with exactly the same punishments p i −i . In the contracting game, when some player deviates, the response of the non-deviators will generally depend on what the deviator does simply because their contracts specify different commitments for different deviations. In the public message mechanism, when player i deviates by refusing to participate, he induces at commitment correspondence
Then given a refinement R, we say that an allocation is supported as an Requilibrium of the public message mechanisms (alternatively, is R-implementable by a simple public message mechanism) if (5.1) and (5.2) hold, and in addition, for every i and 
The Proof of Theorem 3
We write the proof in three parts. The first part shows the 'if' part of the theorem. It is a generalization of the reciprocal contracting idea presented above. Before going on to the more difficult 'only if' part, we prove the Lemma that is interesting for its own sake, and which forms the basis of the second part of our proof. Finally, we give the proof of the only if part.
If Part.
Proof. Suppose that there exist a simple PMM which R-implements the allocation s = (s 1 , ..., s m ) : T → A. According to the arguments in the previous section, this implies that for all i and j there exist a partition of the type space, τ i :
Ti , on-equilibrium restriction r i : T → 2
Ai , off-equilibrium restrictions, p
Ai , and off-equilibrium strategies s , where x tj j is a variable symbol. Consider the following contract in |T | free variables:
where
Notice that the last statement in the third line is always true. Such a statement, however, makes it possible that a player with two different types offers two different but computationally equivalent contracts. 
Recall that γ = c tq γ . Therefore, the previous contract can be rewritten as
By Lemmas 1 and 2, these contracts are all definable. Let us explain the contract c ti γ . If each Player j offers a contract c tj γ for some t j ∈ T j , then c ti γ restricts the 10 In fact, the statement k + 1 > k ∀ k ∈ H (t i ) signals exactly t i ∈ τ (t i ). That is, Player i with types t i and t ′ i offers the same contract if and only if t i ∈ τ i`t ′ i´.
action space of Player i to be r i (t). If each player offers such a contract except Player j, then c ti γ restricts the action space of Player i to be p j i (t −j ). In any other cases, this contract imposes no restrictions on the actions of Player i.
It remains to specify the second-stage strategy of Player i, α i : T i × C → A i for each i. If for all j there is a t j ∈ T j such that Player j offered a contract c tj γ , then α i t i , c tj γ m j=1 = s i (t). Suppose now that one player deviated, say Player j, and offered a contract c j , and player k offered c t k γ for some t k ∈ T k for all k = j. Define f j : T −j → 2 Aj as follows:
denotes the vector of the Godel codes of contracts of the players other than Player j. Define α i t i , c j , c
. These strategies are well-defined because s i is τ −i measurable and s j i is τ −ij measurable. In addition, they are consistent with the restrictions imposed by the contracts by (6.1), that is, s i (t) ∈ r i (t) and s
. In addition, the off-equilibrium strategies satisfy the constraints imposed by the refinement concept, that is, s
(We do not have to specify the strategies if more than one players deviate at the contracting stage.)
Finally, we shall argue that the strategies described above constitute an R−equilibrium in the contracting game. First, we show that the strategies {s i } m i=1 are optimal in the second stage. The constraint (5.1) with t i = t ′ i requires s i (t) to be a best response of Player i with type t i to the strategies of the other players. It remains to show that players do not have incentive to deviate at the contracting stage. Suppose that Player j with type t j offers a contract c j = c tj γ . We shall consider two cases. Case 1: there exists a t γ for all t ′ j ∈ T j . Such a deviation induces Player i (i = j) with type t i to take action s j i (t −j , f j ), where f j is defined by (6.2). Hence, by (5.2) such a deviation cannot be profitable. 6.2. Invariant punishment correspondence. The goal of this section is to show the existence of the punishment correspondence p i −i . The next lemma shows is that there has to existence some fixed punishment correspondence p i −i (t −i ) such that no matter which commitment correspondence Player i wants to implement, there must be a way for him to write his contract in such a way that the response of the nondeviators is exactly the same, and is given by this correspondence p i −i (t −i ). This is a consequence of the fact that contracts are required to be definable functions.
Let c ti i denote the contract of Player i with type t i . Define τ (t) to be
, and every i ∈ {1, ..., m},
Ai , there is a contract c * i such that
and for all k = i
In a contract equilibrium, Player i is expected to offer a contract in the form c ti i . Each alternative contract that he offers induces a commitment correspondence f (t −i ) and elicits some kind of response by the others. The Lemma shows that there must exist some collection of punishment correspondences p i j j =i such that for any commitment correspondence f i that Player i wants, he can write his own contract in such a way that the others respond with exactly the same punishment p
First, we reformulate the statement of the lemma. Let (A i )
|T−i| τ denote the set of |T −i | dimensional vector of subsets of A i which are measurable with respect to τ −i , that is,
as follows:
implies that there exists a contract, c i , available for Player i such that if he offers c i and the type profile of the other players is t −i then the contract profile c i , c
restricts the action space of Player i to be
and the action spaces of the other players to be A t−i −i . We claim the following Lemma 5. The statement of Lemma 4 is equivalent to
for all i ∈ {1, ..., m} and any contract profile c
Proof. Suppose first that (6.5) is true, and A
is an element of the intersection. Define p
Ai , and consider S (f i (t −i )) t−i∈T−i .
Then, there exists a c * i such that equations (6.3) and (6.4) are satisfied because p
Conversely, suppose that (6.5) is false. Then, for all p
. Then, by the definition of S, there does not exist a contract c * i such that (6.3) and (6.4) are satisfied.
By the previous lemma, in order to show Lemma 4, we only have to prove (6.5). We have relegated this proof to the Appendix. Here, we sketch the proof for the case of two players, and where the type space of each player is degenerate. Let c 2 denote the contract of Player 2. Since the type space of Player 2 is degenerate,
A1 and for all B 1 ⊂ A 1 :
We have to show that ∩ B1⊂A1 S (B 1 ) = {∅}. Suppose, by contradiction, that ∩ B1⊂A1 S (B 1 ) = {∅}. Then for all B 2 ⊂ A 2 there exists a B 1 ⊂ A 1 such that B 2 / ∈ S (B 1 ). Therefore, one can construct a function, g : 2 A2 → 2 A1 , such that
Define c x as follows:
.
We shall show (see Lemma 8 in the Appendix) that since c 2 is definable and g has a finite domain, c x is a definable function in one free variable. Let γ denote the Godel code of c x , and notice that < γ > (γ) = c γ . Hence 
by the definition of S. On the other hand,
where the exclusion follows from the construction of g and the equality follows from (6.6). The previous two displayed statements contradict to each others, and hence, ∩ B1⊂A1 S (B 1 ) = {∅}.
Only if part of the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof. Fix an R-equilibrium in the contracting game which implements the allocation s = (s 1 , ..., s m ) : T → A. For all i and j we shall construct the following objects: 
Then we show that (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3) are satisfied.
Denote the equilibrium contract of Player i with type t i by c ti i . Define the partition, τ , as follows:
For all i ∈ {1, ..., m}, let
Notice that r i (t) ⊂ A i , and r i is measurable with respect to τ −i by the definition = s i (t 1 , ..., t m ). Notice that s i (t) is measurable with respect to τ −i . In addition, s i (t) ∈ r i (t) by (6.7) and (6.8).
We are ready to show that the triple (
, s) satisfy (5.1). First, consider this constraint with t ′ i = t i . This constraint requires α i t i , c tj j j to be a best-response of player i with type t i to the strategies of the other players on the equilibrium path. Since α i was an equilibrium strategy, it has to be a best response and hence, (5.1) must be satisfied. Second, consider (5.1) with t R j s, f j (t −j ) × p j −j (t −j ) , τ , t −j and hence, (5.3) is satisfied.
Applications and Examples
This section accomplishes two goals. First, we illustrate some properties of the contracting equilibrium by an example. Second, we compare the set of allocations implementable by a centralized mechanism with those implementable by as an equilibrium in the contracting game.
7.1. Equilibrium Properties. In Section 4 we have discussed several attributes of a contracting equilibrium. Here we illustrate two more properties by an example. First, we show that the informational partition is non-trivial in general. That is, players reveal some information about their types but do not reveal them fully. Second, we show that the contract profile does not restrict the action space of a player to be a single action. That is, a player must still have some flexibility in choosing his action in the last stage of the game. In this sense, contracts are generally incomplete. Notice that the information partition is τ 1 (t 1 ) = t 1 1 . Observe that this allocation cannot be implemented such that all the information is revealed about Player 1's type. This is because if Player 1 would fully reveal his type, Player 2 would not participate in the mechanism and would take action 1, t 2 1 , β . Also notice that this allocation cannot be implemented by complete contracts. This is because Player 1 has to match the second coordinate of his own type by the second coordinate of his action. Recall that he can only reveal the first coordinate of his type. Therefore, it must be the case that r 1 t 
7.2.
Comparison with Centralized Mechanisms. The set of implementable allocations in the contracting game is fairly large. However, as we mentioned before, contract equilibrium imposes a restriction on feasible allocations. When a player decides to deviate at the contracting stage, he knows that he will learn something about the types of the other players when he observes their contracts. Therefore, a deviator's action in the last stage of the game can depend on the information about the types of the other players revealed by the contracts. This suggests that there are allocations which are implementable by centralized mechanisms (where the messages are private) but cannot be implemented by contracts.
By the standard Revelation Principal, a centralized mechanism asks the players to report their types privately. Then the mechanism requires each participant to take an action as a function of the reported type profile of the participants. If a player does not participate in the mechanism, he can take any action he wants. It is without the loss of generality to assume that each player participates and to restrict attention to mechanism-equilibrium pairs where truth-telling constitutes a Bayesian equilibrium.
A centralized mechanism has to specify the target allocation, s : T → A, and for each Player i, what actions the others take if Player i does not participate:
. Then the allocation s is implementable by a centralized mechanism if and only if the following two sets of constraints are satisfied. For all i ∈ {1, ..., m} and t i , t
, and
The inequality (7.1) is the incentive compatibility constraint guaranteeing that a participant player reports his type truthfully. The inequality (7.2) is the participation constraint guaranteeing that each player prefers to participate independently of his type. To show that one can implement more allocations with centralized mechanisms than with contracts, we revisit the example of the previous subsection. Consider the allocation s * = (s * 1 , s * 2 ) : T → A, such that s * , α . Notice that this allocation provides each player with a payoff of fours, and it maximizes the sum of the players' payoff among all allocations. We show that this allocation can be implemented by a centralized mechanism but cannot be implemented by a PMM as a Bayesian equilibrium.
In order to show that s * can be implemented by a centralized mechanism, it is enough to construct s 2 1 : T 1 → A 1 and s 1 2 : T 2 → A 2 such that (7.1) and (7.2) are satisfied for i = 1, 2 with s = s * . We show that the allocation s * can be implemented by a centralized mechanism consider the game. Define s (1, 1, β) . Notice that this allocation maximizes the payoff of Player 1 among all allocations, hence, (7.1) and (7.2) are satisfied for i = 1. Since, the type space of Player 2 is degenerate, we only have to show that Player 2 prefers to participate, that is, (7.2) holds for i = 2. Notice that the right-hand side of (7.2) is zero, and the left-hand side is four. Now, we argue that s * cannot be implemented by a PMM. Notice that in order to implement s * , Player 2 must know the type of Player 1, and therefore, Player 1 has to fully reveal his type at the first stage of the mechanism. If Player 2 decides not to participate and Player 1 reveals that his type is t 1 1 , t 2 1 , Player 2 can take action action 1, t 2 1 , β in the last stage of the mechanism which generates a payoff of five, which is larger than the payoff generated by s * .
Next, we identify some environments where the set of allocations implementable by centralized mechanisms is the same as the set of allocations implementable by contracts.
Assumption 1. For all i and
for all a i ∈ A i . Part (i) of Assumption 1 says that Player i has an action for each of his type which provides him a payoff of at least U (t) no matter what the action profile of the other players is. Part (ii) says that players other than Player i can take an action profile which holds Player i down to at most U (t), no matter what action Player i takes.
Assumption 1 is arguably a strong assumption but is satisfied in many economic environments. One way to interpret part (i) is that Player i can choose not to interact with the other players and take his outside option. The value U i (t) can be thought of as the value of the outside option. Similarly, the action profile a
can be thought of a profile of the other players which forces Player i out of the interaction.
Consider, for example, and auction environment where a single seller is selling a single object to many bidders. The players in this environment are the bidders and the seller. The type of a player is his signal about the value of the object. The action space of a bidder is the amounts of transfers to the seller, and the action space of the seller is whom to sell the object. In this environment Assumption 1 is obviously satisfied, because a bidder can choose not to bid for the object and the seller can decide not to sell it. Proposition 6. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied, and the allocation s : T → A can be implemented by a centralized mechanism. Then the allocation s can be implemented as an R-equilibrium in the contractible contracting game.
Notice that the statement of the proposition holds for any refinement. This is because the allocation s can be implemented by a PMM in which all the restrictions on the action spaces of the players are singletons. That is, even off the equilibrium path, players do not make strategic choices at the second stage.
Proof. Suppose that a centralized mechanism implements s, that is, there exist s
such that (7.1) and (7.2) are satisfied. Notice that by part (i) of Assumption 1: max
. Therefore, (7.2) and the previous inequality implies:
Next, we construct a PMM which implements the allocation s. Consider the fol-
, where τ i (t i ) = {t i },
. That is, the information partition is the full information partition, the equilibrium restrictions are singletons corresponding to s, and if Player j does not participate, Player i's action space is restricted to be the singleton a 
By parts (i) and (ii) of Assumption 1, the right hand side of the previous inequality is E (U i (t) : t i ). Hence, this inequality is just (7.3), which is indeed satisfied.
7.3. Complete Information Environment. In this section, we characterize the set of pure-strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in our model if the players do not possess private information. We prove a pure-strategy Folk Theorem for this environment. That is, we show that for each player there exists a value, such that an allocation is implementable as a SPNE if and only if the payoff of each player is larger than his value.
Define the value for Player i as;
We refer to u i as the pure minmax value of Player i. Proof. According to Theorem 3, it is enough to show that u i (a * ) ≥ u i is satisfied if and only if for all i and j (i = j) there exist on-equilibrium restriction r i ⊂ A i , off-equilibrium restrictions, p j i ⊂ A i , and off-equilibrium strategies s is irrelevant because the action space of each player is restricted to be a single action followed by any deviation. We have to show that both (5.1) and (5.2) are satisfied. Notice that since players have no private information, (5.1) boils down to:
Since r i = {a * i }, this inequality is obviously satisfied. Again, since players have no types, (5.2) can be rewritten as:
where the equality follows from s
Notice that the right-hand-side is just u i , and hence, this inequality is indeed satisfied.
Suppose now that there exists an i ∈ {1, ..., m} such that u i (a * ) < u i . If (5.2) was satisfied, then:
The first inequality is just (5.2), the second follows from setting f i = A i , and the third one follows from the definition of u i . This inequality chain contradicts to u i (a * ) < u i . Hence, we can conclude that (5.2) can only be satisfied if u i (a * ) ≥ u i for all i.
One of the implications of Theorem 7 is that for the complete information case, the set of allocations that are implementable by a centralized mechanism designer is identical to the set of allocations that can be supported by equilibrium in the contracting game. As we have shown (by example) that the same is not generally true for games on incomplete information, this result serves to highlight one of the uses of our characterization theorem.
Conclusion
This paper shows how the contracts on contracts approach can be extended to environments with incomplete information by restricting players to use definable contracts. Definable contracts constitute the largest class of arithmetic contracts which can be written as a finite text in a first order language. In this sense definable contracts embed most other interesting classes of feasible contracts as subsets.
In contrast to the complete information case, we show that the 'folk theorem' doesn't generally hold in the following sense. A centralized mechanism designer can implement allocations that can't be supported as equilibrium with contractible contracts. This limitation is not a consequence of the set of feasible contracts, but rather of the fact that public contracts reveal information about non-deviators' type. The restriction to definable contracts allows us to provide a complete characterization of equilibrium and to prove this result. One of the results we provide as part of our main theorem illustrates the role that punishments play in a static contracting environment.
9. Appendix 9.1. Definability. Our goal here is to provide a formal definitions for arithmetic statement and arithmetic statements with free variables. We shall define statements for any first-order logic and explain what is specific about arithmetics.
Each formal language has a set of symbols. The symbols of a first-order language are divided into two disjoint sets: the logical-symbols, and the non-logic symbols. The logical-symbols include: (, ), ∀, ∃, ¬, =, and infinitely many variable symbols, x 0 , x 1 , .... The non-logic symbols include function-symbols and relation-symbols.
Definition 4. t = F, R, τ is a similarity type, where F is a set of functionsymbols, R is a set of relation-symbols, and τ : F ∪ R → N such that τ (r) > 0 if r ∈ R.
The function τ tells how many variables do the functions and relations have. If τ (f ) = 0, then f is referred to as a constant-symbol.
Example. One of the similarity type corresponding to the Peano Arithmetics, denoted by q = F, R, τ , is: F = {0, 1+, * }, R = {<}, τ (0) = τ (1) = 0, τ (+) = τ ( * ) = τ (<) = 2. Notice that the zero and the one are considered as functions with zero variables, that is, constant symbols. (We point out that the similarity type of arithmetics can be defined without the relation "<". This relation can be then defined recursively.) Definition 5. Let t = F, R, τ be a similarity type. Then the set of expressions of type t, denoted by K (t), is the smallest set for which:
(i) x ∈ K (t) for all variable symbols, (ii) For all f ∈ F , if τ (f ) = 0 then f ∈ K (t), (iii) For all f ∈ F , if τ (f ) = n, and k 1 , ..., k n ∈ K (t) then f (k 1 , ..., k n ) ∈ K (t).
Suppose that t = q. Then the following string of symbols are expressions in arithmetics: x, 0, 1, x + 1, ((x + 1) * (y + 1) + 1) etc.
Finally we are ready to define the set of statements corresponding to a similarity type.
Definition 6. Let t = F, R, τ be a similarity type. Then the set of statements of type t, denoted by F (t), is the smallest set for which:
(i) if r ∈ R, τ (r) = n, and k 1 , ..., k n ∈ K (t) then r (k 1 , ..., k n ) ∈ F (t), (ii) if k 1 , k 2 ∈ K (t) then k 1 = k 2 ∈ F (t) (iii) if φ, η ∈ F (t), then (φ) ∨ (η) ∈ F (t), ¬ (φ) ∈ F (t), and ∃x (φ) ∈ F (t).
The set of arithmetic statements are defined according to the previous definition with t = q. Then the following string of symbols are statements in arithmetics: x = y, ¬∃x∃y (y = x + 1), etc.
For each statement, one can enumerate the number of different variable symbols appearing in the statement. A variable is called free variable in a statement if it does not appear right behind a quantifier. For example, the statement ¬∃x∃y ((y = x + 1) ∨ (z = 1)) has three variable symbols: x, y, and z. However, both the x and the y appears behind a quantifier. Hence, the only free variable of this statement is z. (iv) Let φ C define the characteristic function of C = × k i=1 C i , let φ Cj define the characteristic function of C j , and let ϕ n define the characteristic function of g (n) for n ∈ C. The statements φ C , φ Cj , and ϕ n exist because of part (i) of this lemma. Furthermore, let A i = n ∈ N k : {i : n i / ∈ C i } = i for i ∈ {1, ..., k}. The following statement defines the characteristic function of A i for i ∈ {1, ..., k}: This ϕ obviously satisfies (9.1). Next, we construct a statement, ψ, in ql|B||D| free variables such that 
